Dr. Wang-Yen Lee is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore. He read theology at Singapore Bible College and received his MPhil in philosophy of religion and PhD in philosophy of science from the University of Cambridge. As a member of St Edmund’s College, he was awarded the Coventry Prize for Divinity in 2005 for his MPhil work, and the Emsley Prize for his PhD work in 2007-08. After submitting his PhD thesis in 2008, he worked briefly as a postdoctoral research assistant at the Faraday Institute.

As a third-generation Christian brought up in multi-religious Malaysia, Dr. Lee has been interested in the justification of Christian belief since he was a child. Years of reflection has led to his deep sense of revulsion at the postmodernist attack on truth and a conviction that the most general principles and criteria in the confirmation of large-scale scientific theories are very similar to those we can use to develop rigorous arguments for Christian theism. He sees his current work in general philosophy of science and epistemology and interests in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, and science and religion as integral to his long-term plan to contribute to the justification of traditional Christian belief.

Selected recent publications

  • 2009. Does Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism Work? Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 45: 73-83.
  • 2009. A Pragmatic Case against Pragmatic Theological Realism. The Heythrop Journal: a Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology 50: 479-94. (Blackwell) *2008.The Chinese translation of this paper is published in Logos and Pneuma: Chinese Journal of Theology 28: 245-74 (Hong Kong)
  • 2007. A Pragmatic Case against Pragmatic Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (Nov): 299-313.

Work submitted for publication: New Evidence and the No-Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism. (under review at Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science)

Work in progress: Simplicity and the Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Induction.

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